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MARRIED WOMEN AS BANKRUPTS.
THE much-vexed question of the rights and liabilities of married women seems to take a new phase in the development of the
Bankrupt Act. The act seeks to establish "a uniform system of
bankruptcy throughout the United States;" but an examination of
the cases under it concerning married women, and the reasons and
principles applicable to them, show that so far from the system
being uniform in this regard it varies with the statutes and
decisions of every state.
In New York, where, since the statutes of 1848 and 1849 and
.he more recent amendments, it is well known that a married
woman may be sued at law upon her contracts, it has been held
that she is within the meaning of the act, and can be declared a
bankrupt. The Court of Appeals of that state, after much discussion and consideration, has finally arrived at the conclusion that
afeme covert is bound by all her contracts made in her separate
business, or in relation to her separate estate, and that such contracts can be enforced at law or in equity, as the case may be,
Corn .ELhange Ins. Co. v. Babeock, 42 N. Y. 642, and judgment
may be given against her in the -ame manner as against other pcrsons; Hier v. Staples, 51 Id. 136; First Nat. Bank of Canandaiguav. Garlinghouse, 58 Barbour 61b.
And although the question has never been elaborately argued or
decided in the Federal courts of that state, it seems to have been
taken for granted that they could be proceeded against in bankVOL. XXII.-9
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ruptcy, a,,d such has been the practice: in re Mfary A. O'Brien
Bank. Reg., Supplement 38; Graham, Assignee, ft., v. Srtark et
al., 3 Bank. Reg. 82.
But under the rule in Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, and 22
Id. 450, at that time the leading case on the subject in that
state, that in a iuit against a married woman upon a promissory
note it must either appear upon the face of the note that it was
her intention to bind her separate estate, or it must be alleged tha
the note was given for the benefit of her separate estate, Judge
hIALL decided in In re Howland, 2 Bank. Reg. 114, that a
petition in bankruptcy must follow the same principle, and that
the allegation that the respondent had a separate estate, and
intended in the execution and delivery of the notes to bind it was
not sufficient, such intent not appearing upon the face of the
instrument, and there being no allegation in the petition that the
indebtedness was of such a character as to be a charge upon her
estate, he dismissed the petition with leave to amend.
One of the more recent cases, Poster v. Conger, 61 Barbour
145, decided at general term, maintains the advanced doctrine
that a married woman may sue and be sued upon all contracts or
liabilities made or incurred in her business; that such action may
be brought in the same manner as against any other individual;
that the judgment is personal, to be enforced against any property
she may have, liable to execution as in ordinary cases; that her
obligation and liability are precisely the same as if she had never
been married; and that it was not of the slightest consequence
that she had no separate estate before engaging in the business in
which the debt was contracted, nor that the debt was not contracted for the benefit of her separate estate. In any place where
this should be the settled law, there certainly could be no objection
to the jurisdiction of the bankrupt court.
It was upon the same principle announced by Judge BLATCHFORD, though not carried to the same extent, that Judge GRESHAM decided the recent case In re RacheZ Goodman, reported in
the " Chicago Legal News," for October 1st 1873. That was a
petition in the usual form upon an indebtedness for goods sold
and delivered, but containing no special allegations other than
that the respondent was a married woman, engaged in business in her own name; but inasmuch as by the laws of
Indiana a married woman, although protected ;n her separate
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estate, and authorized to carry on business if she have such estate,
is not bound by her contracts except in reference to her separate
property, and cannot enter into a partnership with her husband,
nor retain her personal earnings, the court held that the
petition was fatally defective in not setting forth that she had a
separate estate. No doubt this is the correct rule, and that
a petitioner must show affirmatively sufficient to bring a married
woman within the law. We are not aware that it has yet been
held under any statute or in any court that a married woman
is bound absolutely by all her general engagements. Though the
tendency may be in that direction, that ultimate point does not
seem anywhere to have been-reached.
In Minnesota, where many of the common-law disabilities have
been removed by statute, and where a married woman may,
under certain circumstances, engage in business in her own name
by obtaining a license from a probate justice, in which case she is
bound by her contracts entered into in the course of her business,
Judge NELSoN held that a married woman engaging in business
as a member of a partnership, but without having complied with
the requirements of the statute, could avail herself of her coverture to defeat bankruptcy proceedings against her: In re Slichter,
2 Bank. Reg. 107.
The liability of married women has recently been carried in
Illinois to as great an extent as in any of the United States, the
Federal courts here, as elsewhere, following the doctrines and applying the principles of the state tribunals.
The statute of 1861, giving a married woman the right to
property which she owned at the time of her marriage, or might
subsequently acquire from any person other than her husband, was
the first innovation upon the old common-law rule, and since that
time the Supreme Court of that state, through a long, course of
decisions, commencing with .Enerson v. Clalton, 32 Ills. 493, .has
been gradually giving to married women more absolute control
over their separate estate and personal remedies to enforce their
rights, but at the same time retaining the old equity doctrine that
proceedings against them must be in equity. This was the rule as
late as Mitchell v. arpenter, 50 Ills. 470.
But in the later case of Cookson v. Poole, reported in 5 Chicago Legal News 184, and under the influence of the statute of
1869, giving to a married woman the right to her personal earn-
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ings, the court on a review of the former decisions holds that a
married woman holding property has the legal capacity to contract
in relation to it, such contracts are cognisable by courts of law,
and that her estate is no longer a mere creation of equity, but an
absolute legal estate.
Under this state of the law Judge BLODGETT, of the U. S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,.held in the
Kinzkead case, reported in 7 National Bankr. Reg. 439, and recently affirmed by Judge DRUAIMOND in the Circuit Court, that a
married woman could be a partner in business with her husband,
and as such be adjudged a bankrupt; that as she had been held
out to the world as a partner equally with her husband, and as the
firm had acquired assets and contracted liabilities a court of bankruptcy could take jurisdiction of the whole estates, and administer
them under the law, and in this case Judge BLODGETT went further,
and placed the jurisdiction of the court also upon the broader
ground of a court of equity, marshalling the assets of the several
estates, and distributing them among .thelparties according to their
equitable interests, a doctrine which does not seem to have been
previously broached. He held that for the purposes of that case
the bankrupt court was clothed with all'the powers of a court of
equity, and that bankruptcy having intervened the court should
distribute the assets without reference to ithe question whether the
creditors had any further remedy to recover ahy unpaid balances.
And since the above decision the Supreme Court of Illinois has
gone far beyond all its previous decisions, and in the case of
Martin v. Rob8on, 5 Chicago Legal News 304, has swept
away most of the ancient landmarks as to the rights and liabilities
of fenes covert, and in Illinois, so far as their separate estates are
concerned, and as to their rights and liabilities in cases of tort, they
may now be considered as occupying the legal position of femes
8ole: That court, in an elaborate opinion by THORNTON, J., reviewing all its previous decisions, declares that a married woman
has the right not only to her personal earnings, but to her time,
with which she may acquire these earnings; that the husband is
no longer liable for her debts before marriage, nor her torts afterwards; that she need not join her husband in suits at law for
property, trespass or slander, but may even bring suit against him;
that she may be sued at law on her contracts, and execute a valid
lease of her separate property ; and that, since the legal supremacy
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of the husband is gone, and she has the control of her own
property, time and skill, she alone should be responsible for
slander uttered by her during coverture, and ihat the necessary
operation of the statute is to absolutely discharge the husband
from such liability.
As these few scattered cases, together with the ruling of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in the case of .Tarriett E. Oollins, ,.,, ye, reported, that
the court has jurisdiction of a voluntary petition by a married
woman, constitute all the reported .authorities in the United
States, we must look for a more elaborate and logical discussion
of the questions in the courts of England, the provisions of whose
Bankrupt Act in this respect are similar to our own.
It would seem to be the rule that any person capable of making
a binding contract is amenable to bankruptcy proceedings, and
that in so far as the common-law disabilities of a fene covert are
removed she comes within the jurisdiction of the Bankrupt Law.
This rule, which is as consonant to reason and justice as it is
capable of general appliation, seems first to have been stated by
Cooke in his work on Bankruptcy, published a full century ago, in
W:hich lie says: "The criterion, therefore, of a feme covert being
capable of falling under the bankrupt laws, appears to be her
liability to be sued to execution for the debts she has- contracted
during coverture. A commission of bankruptcy is considered as
a statute execution. If a married woman is so circumstanced as
to be subject to a common-law execution, there does not occur any
reason why she should not likewise be subject to this statute
execution."
It was upon this principle that when, in 1772, the commissioners
refused to find Mrs. Anne :Fitzgerald a bankrupt, because although
she had property settled upon her, and bad entered into a deed of
separation from her husband, she was a feme covert, residing in
the county of Middlesex, and not a trader in the city of London,
Lord Chancellor APSLEY, on appeal, ordered the commissioners to
declare her a bankrupt, and the messenger to take possession of
her property. The authority of this case is supported by Lord
MANSFIELD in 1?ingstead v. Lanesborough, 3 Douglas 197, and
Barwell v. Brooks, and (orbet v. Polnitz, I Term R. 5.
The same general principle is evidently the reason of the rule
according to which persons who could not otherwise have been pro-
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ceeded against in bankruptcy have, by trading, bcajme amenable
to the proceedings, even though such trading may have been positively prohibited by law. Thus a clergyman may become a bankrupt, Ex parte Meiqnot, 1 Atkyns 196, even though in priest's
orders, Ifanky v. Jones, Cowper 745; a public officer, Bighmore
"v. Habllorg, 1 Atkyns 206; an executor, if lie continues the
testator's busine'ss beyond what is necessary to close up the estate;
Exparte Mott, I Atkyns 102; Ex parte Garland,10 Vesey 110;
Viner v. Cadell, 3 Espinasse 88.
The remedy for the creditor by petition would certainly seem
to be at least co-extensive with the liability of the debtor; for an
infant, if he has held himself out as a trader and sui juris, has
been held amenable, Ex parte Adam, 1 Vesey & Beames 494; or
has affirmed the debt after attaining his majority, Belton v.
Hod es, 9 Bingliam 860; or if at the time of contracting the
debt lie made express statements that he was of age, -Ex parte,
Watson, 16 Vesey 265; Lxparte Bates, 2 Montague, Deacon &
DeGex 337.
The doctrine that aferne covert, who has been deserted by her
husband, and been trading as afeme sole, should be held on her
debts, has the authority of the U. S. Supreme Court. In .Rhea v.
Bhenner, 1 Peters 108, this is stated to be the well settled rule,
the court citing both English and Massachusetts authorities, and
arguing that the rule is for the benefit of the femne covert, as otherwise she could not obtain credit, and would have no means of gaining a livelihood.
In England, as far back as the earliest days of lie custom of
London, a married woman, who, as a trader, had con -acted debts,
might be proceeded against in bankruptcy: Lavie -, Philips, 3
Burrow 1783; -x parte Carrington, 1 Atkyns 206; -x parte
Franks, 7 Bingham 762.
But the leading case is Johnson v. Gallagher,30 Law Jour. 298,
in which TURNER, L. J., elaborately discusses the rights and
liabilities of married women, and after a review of the cases as to
their right to charge or encumber their separate estates, and their
liability upon notes, bills and spec'alties, concludes that not only
these but also their general engagements may affect their separate
estates; that where a woman was living separate from her husband,
and had a separate estate, the court is bound to impute to her the
intention to deal with her separate estate unless the contrary is
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clearly proven ; that the court cannot impute to her the dishonesty
of not intending to pay for the goods she purchased; but that in
order to bind her separate estate by a general engagement it
should appear that the engagement was made with reference to
and upon the faith or credit of that estate, and that whether it
was so made was a question to be judged of by the court upon all
the circumstances of the case. This case was expressly approved
in A4frs. JMatthewman's Case, L. R. 3 Eq. 781, in which a married woman was held to be a contributory to a joint stock company; in Picardv. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 274, and by Lord Rom .
ILLY, Master of the Rolls, in i1fcHenry v. Davies, L. R. 10 Eq. 88.
It will be seen, therefore, that the liability of married women
had already been considerably extended at the time of the passage
of the Married Women's Property Act, August 9th 1870. All of
the above decisions were rendered before that time, and as that
act gives, among other things, to married women the right to their
separate earnings, there can be no question that their liability
under their general engagements is still farther extended.
There seems to be no doubt as to the rule that a married woman
may be a voluntary bankrupt wherever there is a liability either
of the person or of the estate t6 be discharged.
Our Bankrupt Law says: § 11, "1Any person residing within the
jurisdiction of the United States, owing debts, &c.," may be
adjudged a bankrupt; also, § 89, "Any person residing and
owing debts as aforesaid," &c.; and these two are the jurisdictional
sections in voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy. Where a
woman may owe she may be bankrupt; where she cannot there is
nothing upon which to found the proceedings. 11er capacity to
owe can only be determined by state legislation or interpretation;
one state may establish one rule, and another a different rule ; but
Congress has no jurisdiction to legislate on the subject; such power
was not granted in the Constitution, and is reserved to the states.
The foundation of bankruptcy proceedings is indebtedness;
without this there is no basis for jurisdiction. Thus a simple
promise, or a note without consideration, not being a legal claim.
is not such a demand as will support proceedings in bankruptcy:
In ie Cornwell, 4 Bankrupt Reg. 134 Nor is an infant, as to
his general engagements, a subject of either voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy: In re Derby, 8 Bankr. Reg. 106.
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Impossible as it may be to reconcile the decisions on the general
question of the rights and liability of married women, the duty
of the Federal courts in applying the Bankrupt Law in these cases
would seem to be of a simpler character. If they determine the
status of a married woman under the existing law of the state
where the jurisdiction is to be exercised, and administer the Bankrupt Law upon the basis of the principles thus discovered, they
have done all that can be required. The application of the Bankrupt Law to married women depends clearly, not upon their rights,
but their liabilities. Those liabilities are determined by the law
of the forum where the jurisdiction is invoked.
The Bankrupt Act does notxnake any new standard of liability,
but simply operates upon those already existing.1 Wherever a
married woman cannot contract a legal debt she has no need to be
discharged from it, and the creditor can have no standing in court,
as his claim in such case has no substance or legal entity. In a
jurisdiction where her estate is but a creature of equity, the
creditor should lay the proper foundation for proceedings against
it, and use apt words to charge it. Where she may be sued either
in law or chancery no more specific allegations seem to be necessary than would sustain an ordinary action against her at common
law or in chancery, as the case might be. Where she can be a
partner with her husband she can also be adjudged a bankrupt in
proceedings against such partnership.
And if any state shall go so far beyond Martin v. .Robson as
to place a mfrried woman ofi the same legal footing as her husband, there will be no more difficulty in the bankruptcy of the one
than of the other. In all cases where a plea of coverture would not
avail her, a married woman may be proceeded against in bankruptcy.
This varying rule in different jurisdictions is therefore not such
an irregularity as the exemption clause, the constitutionality of
which was at first doubted, for there is a clear underlying principle to which the various decisions may be referred, and by which
they may be reconciled.
J. I. BISSELL.
Chicago.
I It does not undertake to establish a uniform rule for the legality of contracts
or the liability of persons, any more than it does to establish a uniform statute of
limitation or a general statute of frauds, or a certain age at which infancy shall

cease.and liability commence, or decide whether remedies shall be at law or i.
equity.

